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Abstract 
 
We investigate the transparency of executive stock option disclosures of Australian 
firms for the financial years ending 2000 and 2002.  Transparency is measured using 
an index based on the requirements of the accounting standards dealing specifically 
with the disclosure of executive stock options.  Our study also examines the 
relationship between firm characteristics and disclosure transparency and the 
difference in transparency between the years 2000 and 2002.  We find that the 
transparency of executive stock option disclosures is low but improves a little in the 
year 2002.  We also find that the existence of a compensation committee is positively 
associated with transparency with size being the only significant control variable. Our 
results are consistent with the contention of Hope (2003a) that managers of firms 
appear to be treating mandatory requirements as voluntary, possibly due to the low 
levels of enforcement of the accounting standards. 
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The Transparency of Executive Stock Option Disclosures in Australian Annual Reports 
1. Introduction 
We investigate the transparency or disclosure quality1 of executive stock option 
(ESO) disclosures in the corporate annual reports of Australian firms for the years 2000 
and 2002.  We use a disclosure index based on the requirements of the accounting 
standards which address specifically ESO disclosures. There is limited research on the 
extent of disclosure of ESOs, however, some studies have encountered this issue when 
conducting a study of executive compensation. For example, Coulton and Taylor (2002), in 
studying the components of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation, noted the lack 
of adequate disclosures of ESOs.  As well, Maller, Tan and Vyver (2002), in studying the 
valuation of ESOs, included a short discussion on ESO disclosures observed.  Coulton, 
James and Taylor (2001) are one of the few studies that have focused on the disclosures of 
CEO stock options in companies’ annual reports. 
Accounting for ESOs is a very topical issue due to the dramatic increase in their 
use by large corporate bodies over the past decade (Murphy, 1998). Accounting firms, such 
as KPMG and Deloitte, argue for greater disclosure requirements rather than recognition 
requirements (Coulton and Taylor, 2002).  Most firms disclose very limited amounts of 
information about stock options in the notes to the financial statements (Coulton and 
Taylor, 2002).  Greater disclosure is required to assist in providing users of financial 
statements with better quality information about the financial effects that ESOs have on 
firms.   
This study is motivated by the lack of research that has directly addressed the issue 
of the disclosure of ESOs, as most prior research focuses on the measurement or 
recognition of stock options.  Previous studies have found that in some environments, 
firms behave towards mandatory requirements as if they are voluntary (Marston and 
                                                 
1 The terms ‘disclosure quality’ and ‘transparency’ will be used interchangeably throughout this paper.  
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Shrives, 1996).  In Hope’s (2003a) study, which addresses the enforcement of accounting 
standards in various countries, the results indicate that Australia may be a country where 
managers treat mandatory standards as voluntary when compared to the enforcement levels 
in other countries, such as the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (U.K.).  
Hope’s study also suggests that stronger enforcement of accounting standards encourages 
managers to follow the accounting standards that have been implemented.2
In studying the transparency or disclosure quality of ESOs we adopt the definition 
of Pownall and Schipper (1999). Pownall and Schipper refer to financial statements as 
being of high quality if they possess three attributes: transparency, full disclosure and 
comparability. Transparent financial statements are statements that “reveal the events, 
transactions, judgments, and estimates underlying the statements, and their implications” 
(Pownall and Schipper, 1999, 262). Transparency allows users to see the results and 
implications of the decisions, judgments and estimates of preparers. Full disclosure relates 
to the provision of all information necessary for decision-making, thereby providing 
reasonable assurance that investors are not misled. Finally, comparability means that 
similar transactions and events are accounted for in the same manner, both cross-
sectionally among firms and over time for a given firm. 
   Ball, Robin and Wu (2004) claim that quality is an elusive concept. Other 
definitions of quality include that of Ball et al. (2004) who interpret transparency in 
financial statements as the timely incorporation of economic income in accounting income, 
and hence the book value of equity.  Lang, Raedy and Yetman (2002) assert that a firm 
will be more transparent to the market if it provides more informative accounting data.  
                                                 
2 Australia rated tenth out of 22 countries in Hope’s (2003a) results.  The highest scores were exhibited by 
USA, which scored 1.21, and the UK, which scored 1.16.  The lowest score was Spain with –3.65. Australia 
scored – 0.25. 
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Coulton et al. (2001) define transparency as the level of detail provided in the annual 
report. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways.  First, we measure 
the transparency of ESO disclosures using the requirements of AASB 1028 (1994) 
‘Accounting for Employee Entitlements’ and AASB 1017 (1997) ‘Related Party 
Disclosures’, which are assumed to be high quality standards.  Second, we examine the 
association between the transparency of ESOs and firm characteristics.  These 
characteristics include compensation committee, ownership concentration, listing status, 
size, leverage, performance and Big 5 auditor.  Finally, the transparency of ESO 
disclosures is investigated and compared in the financial years 2000 and 2002.   
We find that the transparency of mandatory information pertaining to ESOs is low. 
Although the level of transparency increases in the year 2002 it still remains low. The 
existence of a compensation committee is positively associated with transparency with the 
only control variable that is significant in both models being size. The results appear to 
support the contention of Hope (2003a), that the managers of firms appear to be treating 
mandatory requirements as voluntary possibly due to the low levels of enforcement of the 
accounting standards. 
The remaining sections of this paper are as follows.  Section 2 describes the 
legislative background.  Section 3 reviews previous literature and outlines the hypotheses. 
Section 4 outlines the data and research design. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background  
There are several pieces of legislation that contain disclosure requirements for 
executive compensation.  These requirements are found in the Corporations Act 2001, 
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sections s. 300A and s.300 as well as the Australian Accounting Standards AASB 1028 
‘Accounting for Employee Entitlements’, AASB 1017 ‘Related Party Disclosures’ and 
AASB 1034 ‘Financial Report Presentation and Disclosures’.  The Corporations Act will 
not be used in this study because s.300A applies broadly to executive compensation, with 
no specific requirements for ESOs and both s. 300 and s. 300A only require disclosures to 
be made about the directors and five most highly remunerated officers.  These disclosures 
are required to be made in the directors’ report.  We are investigating the transparency of 
ESO disclosures for all executives, not just the five most highly remunerated, in the notes 
to the financial statements.  AASB 1034 ‘Financial Report Presentation and Disclosures’ 
also is not included because it requires the disclosures of those executives whose 
remuneration is $100,000 or more.  There may be smaller companies that do not pay their 
executives these amounts of remuneration, but they may still use ESOs. 
Coulton et al. (2001) carried out a study investigating the transparency of CEO 
compensation, including stock options.  Their study used s.300 and s. 300A of the 
Corporations Law3 to determine the level of transparency over the three-year period 1998 
to 2000, in which a regulatory change occurred.  Our study complements their study by 
examining the transparency of ESOs using the accounting standards AASB1028 (1994) 
and AASB 1017 (1997) for the years ending 2000 and 2002; the years surrounding the 
major corporate collapses which occurred in the year 2001. A new accounting standard 
(AASB 1028 (2001)) was also introduced in this year, effective from 1 July 2002.  
Therefore, a 30 June financial year-end has been chosen because the new accounting 
standard, AASB1028 (2001), became effective from 1 July 2002.   
 AASB 1028 and AASB 1017 establish disclosure requirements for equity based 
remuneration schemes which include options, in the annual reports of the company.  
                                                 
3 Sections s.300 and s. 300A are the same in the Corporations Act 2001 as those sections in the Corporations 
Law. 
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AASB 1028 was issued in 1994 and applies to financial years ending on or after 30 June 
1995.  It was subsequently reissued in June 2001 and is operative for annual reporting 
periods beginning on or after 1 July 2002.  The disclosure requirements of AASB 1028 
(2001) are more detailed than those outlined in the previous standard requiring the 
disclosure of share options and other equity-based instruments that were exercised during 
the reporting period (and their fair value), lapsed during the reporting period, as well as 
requiring disclosures for the end of the reporting period, however this standard does not 
require recognition and measurement of stock options issued.  The changes have been 
made in order to be more closely aligned with the IAS standard as part of the international 
harmonisation process. AASB 1017 ‘Related Party Disclosures’ was issued in February 
1997. 
Under these standards stock options are not required to be measured or recognised 
in the company’s accounts (AASB 1028 (paragraph 5(c)).  The disclosure requirements for 
Equity Based remuneration, focusing on ESO disclosures are included in paragraph 14 (d) 
and are recorded in Appendix A. Although AASB 1017 ‘Related Party Disclosures’ 
applies to directors, the component of this standard relating to executive director’s stock 
options is relevant for this study. The disclosure requirements for the executive director’s 
stock options are included in paragraph 4.15 and 4.16 and are recorded in Appendix A.  
For the purposes of our study the above accounting standards are assumed to be of a high 
quality.  That is, firms that fully comply with these standards provide transparent or high 
quality information. 
 
3. Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development 
Several studies have found a relationship between disclosure quality and firm 
characteristics, measuring quality using either the Association of Investment and 
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Management Research (AIMR) rankings or the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) 
rankings.  Studies have shown that disclosure quality is related to both size and listing 
status (Firth, 1979; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Lang et al., 2002). Firms cross-listed in the 
U.S. are also subject to greater disclosure requirements and enforcement mechanisms 
(Lang et al., 2002).  Higher quality disclosures lead to lower information asymmetry, 
increased market liquidity (Heflin, Shaw and Wild, 2001), and lower cost of debt 
(Sengupta, 1998).  Other studies provide additional evidence that the level of information 
disclosed is related to characteristics of the company, for example size and performance 
(Coulton et al., 2001).  Coulton et al. (2001) also show that a change in accounting 
regulations increased the levels of transparency.  
Research examining the levels of compliance with countries’ accounting standards 
indicates that without appropriate enforcement mechanisms, the accounting standards will 
not be followed completely, even where the standards are of a high quality themselves 
(Hope, 2003a).  The lack of enforcement will allow mandatory requirements to be treated 
as voluntary as observed in Hope (2003a).  The results from Hope’s study indicate that 
Australia is a country where the managers of corporations treat mandatory requirements as 
voluntary when compared to the U.S. and the U.K. Bradshaw and Miller (2002) found that 
non-U.S. firms that were voluntarily adopting U.S. GAAP were not applying the standards 
properly yet still asserting that they were conforming with the standards in order to receive 
the desired benefits.   
Ball et al. (2004), in examining the financial reporting quality and its relationship 
with the incentives faced by the managers and auditors, report that even when high quality 
standards are in place, this does not necessarily lead to the information produced being of a 
high quality. The four East Asian countries included, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand, are countries where the financial statements have been heavily influenced by 
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U.S., U.K. and international accounting standards.  Although these standards emphasise 
financial statement transparency, the financial statements in these countries were found to 
lack transparency due to the economic and political incentives faced by management. 
In our study we are investigating the relationship between the transparency of ESO 
disclosures of Australian companies and firm characteristics. The firm characteristics 
include compensation committee, ownership concentration, listing status plus several 
control variables.  As well, the possible impact of corporate collapses on transparency is 
examined. 
 
3.1 Corporate Governance 
Recent corporate collapses, such as Enron and HIH, have contributed to the 
recognition and disclosure issues surrounding the issuance of ESOs.  The agency problem 
associated with aligning executive’s interests with those of the company’s shareholders in 
many cases remains unresolved (Coulton et al., 2001).  Issuing stock options to executives 
is one way in which firms try to reduce this agency problem. By giving the executives 
ownership in the firm they are then expected to act in the firms’ interests and hence, the 
shareholders interests.   
This brings into question the corporate governance mechanisms, such as the 
compensation committee, which is responsible for determining the compensation given to 
executives.  Coulton et al. (2001) state that one area where corporate governance attributes 
are frequently cited as being necessary to defend the interests of outside shareholders is 
executive compensation.  Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) found evidence that 
weaker corporate governance is associated with excessive CEO compensation.  Based on 
Core et al., Coulton et al. expected that corporate governance attributes might be associated 
with the degree of transparency of compensation disclosures.  However, Coulton et al. did 
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not find any direct evidence of governance attributes directly affecting the transparency of 
CEO compensation disclosures.  However, Davis (2001) found a positive association 
between the existence of a compensation committee and voluntary disclosure. This leads to 
the first hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1:  Companies with a compensation committee have more transparent 
   ESO disclosures than companies that do not have a compensation  
   committee.  
 
3.2 Ownership Concentration 
Hope (2003b) suggests that a concentrated ownership structure may be associated 
with management incentives to reduce accounting information quality to the extent that 
outside investors will not trust the firm’s reported earnings.  Consistent with prior literature 
(Claessens et al, 2002 and Fan and Wong, 2002), Hope (2003b) shows that highly 
concentrated ownership is associated with less investor demand for the role of an analyst, 
leading to diminished firm value and reduced accounting quality (Hope, 2003b).     The 
above leads to our second hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Companies with lower ownership concentration provide more   
  transparent ESO disclosures than companies with higher ownership  
  concentration. 
 
3.3 Listing Status 
The enforcement of accounting standards is an important issue because without 
adequate enforcement procedures, the requirements of the mandatory standards can be 
regarded as voluntary by managers.  Hope (2003a) suggests that higher enforcement 
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encourages managers to comply with the accounting standards that have been 
implemented.  Hope’s study raised the issue that some firms are treating mandatory 
requirements as voluntary.  The study provides evidence that Australia has a lower level of 
enforcement compared to countries such as the U.S., U.K. and Canada.  Lang et al. (2002) 
found that firms which are cross-listed (i.e., listed on the stock exchange of more than one 
country), and hence subject to enhanced disclosure requirements and increased 
enforcement, provide more informative accounting data than firms that are not cross-listed.  
Firms that are cross–listed appear to exhibit higher disclosure levels.  For the 
purposes of this study cross-listed firms are those that are listed in both Australia and the 
U.S.  Higher levels of disclosure occur because the firms need to fulfil different 
requirements for the different exchanges, thereby giving them increased disclosure levels.  
This leads to our third hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3:  Companies that are also listed in the U.S. have more transparent ESO 
disclosures than those that are not listed in the U.S. 
 
3.4 Corporate Collapses 
When companies fail in the manner of Enron and HIH, the reporting practices of all 
companies become a focus of investors and other external parties.  There is now more 
pressure for companies to ensure that their annual reports are transparent, presenting a ‘true 
and fair’ view of the company’s operations.  Many companies have now decided to 
voluntarily disclose information that is not normally required to be disclosed by the 
accounting standards, particularly in the U.S. This leads to our fourth hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4:  Executive stock option disclosures have become more transparent in     
the year 2002 as compared to the year 2000. 
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4. Data  and Research Design 
4.1 Data 
The firms used in this study have been selected from the top 400 listed companies 
using the BRW Top 500 for 2002.  To be included in the study, these firms must satisfy 
three criteria: 
a) Financial year ending 30 June4; 
b) Listed on ASX for 2000; 
c) Listed on ASX for 2002; and 
The total sample size used was 197, pooled for the financial years 2000 and 2002.  Figure 
1 illustrates the reason companies were eliminated from the sample. 
Companies use their annual reports to communicate their progress and performance to 
outside parties, such as shareholders, potential shareholders and creditors.  The annual 
reports contain both quantitative and qualitative information that can be used by outside 
parties for investment decisions and lending decisions.  We downloaded the annual reports 
used in this study from the Annual Report Collection (Connect 4) online database.  The 
reports were manually searched for the details on ESO disclosures. The above years have 
been chosen to observe any changes in the level of disclosure over the three year period 
due to environmental changes.  June 2000 is the financial year before the collapse of major 
corporations. June 2002 is the financial year after the major corporate collapses and is also 
the financial year before the implementation of the new accounting standard AASB1028 
on 1 July 2002.5   
 
                                                 
4 The 30 June financial year end was chosen because the new accounting standard AASB1028 (2001) 
became effective from 1 July 2002. 
 
5 This standard was issued in 2001 to be implemented from the financial year beginning 1 July 2002. 
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4.2 Research Design 
  The notes to the financial statements were examined to collect information 
regarding ESO disclosures.  Firms are required under AASB 1028 and AASB 1017 to 
disclose certain information pertaining to their ESO plans and the issuance of ESOs. The 
accounting standards are expected to provide the minimum requirements for transparency.   
Disclosure quality, in many studies, is measured based on indices formed by the 
AIMR and the FAF.  Studies that have used this approach include Bushee and Noe (1999), 
Price (1998), and Heflin, Shaw and Wild (2001).  These studies are measuring the quality 
of the information in the financial statements. Other studies have measured disclosure 
quality as the level, or quantity, of information presented in the annual reports.  These 
studies include Hope (2003a) who uses the scores developed by the Centre for 
International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) that evaluate disclosure quantity, 
to measure corporate disclosure quality. Another term frequently used in the literature is 
‘transparency’.  Transparent financial statements, as defined by Pownall and Schipper 
(1999), are statements that reveal the events, transactions, judgements and estimates 
underlying the financial statements, and their implications.   Coulton et al. (2001) define 
transparency as the level of detail in the annual reports. We define transparency as the level 
of compliance of the financial statements with the specific accounting standards.  
Accounting standards are assumed to provide the minimum level of disclosure to be 
transparent (as defined in Pownall and Schipper, 1999)6.    
 
 
 
                                                 
6 This study is not addressing the Corporations Act 2001 because the requirements do not include disclosures 
for all executives, which is what this study is examining.  Coulton et al. (2001) have already completed a 
study on this requirement, in the Corporations Law, for CEO stock options. 
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Transparency of Stock Options Disclosure 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is disclosure transparency.  For the purposes of this study a 
disclosure index has been developed for ESO disclosures to represent ‘transparency’ based 
on the information disclosed in the notes to the annual reports. A disclosure index allows 
us to equally weight each section of the standard in order to calculate a standard score for 
each company.  The disclosure requirements of AASB1028 (1994) and AASB 1017 for 
equity based compensation have been used to form the index.  These standards have been 
used because they were active for the financial years 2000 and 2002 until 30 June 2002. 
Six categories of information have been identified.  The first five categories are the 
information requirements as stated by the accounting standard AASB 1028 (1994).  The 
sixth category is the requirements stated by AASB 1017.  The categories for AASB 1028 
are: the nature of the equity-based compensation schemes, price information, number and 
type up to and at reporting date, number and type issued during the year, and accounting 
policy information.  The mandatory requirements for AASB 1017 are: the aggregate 
number of options acquired, disposed of and held, and the nature of the terms and 
conditions.  A score of one is given for each item in the index that is disclosed, both 
quantitative and qualitative, and a zero is given if companies do not disclose any of the 
information required (see Appendix A). 
 The first dependent variable is a continuous variable which has been calculated as a 
score out of 1 (or 100 percent). There are six categories in total in the index.  To make each 
category of the index contribute to the total score of 1 (or 100 percent), firstly, the number 
of components disclosed within a category are added together and then divided by the total 
number of components in that category.  For example, Appendix A contains the scores of a 
company we have designated as company “X”. In the first category, company “X” 
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disclosed only one component out of a total four components for that category. The total 
for that category for company “X” is 0.25 (1/4). This ensures that each category 
contributes a score of one to the total disclosure score. This procedure is followed for each 
category.  The transparency of ESO disclosures are measured by dividing the actual total 
score for each company by the total possible score of that a company can achieve. For 
example, the calculation for company “X” is: (0.25 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 0.50 + 0.83)/6 = 0.597 
(Appendix A). The score of 0.597 becomes 59.70 percent, which is the final disclosure 
score for company “X” and we can conclude that this company discloses 59.70 percent of 
the mandatory information.     
 The second dependent variable, a dichotomous dependent variable, is calculated 
based on the continuous variable. We have explored testing the model using various splits 
of the 0/1 binary variable. We found the logistic regression model, where 60 percent or 
greater compliance level is the dependent variable, produced stronger results and additional 
useful information about the nature of companies with more transparent ESO disclosures.7 
The number of firms complying with the mandatory accounting standards reduces from 84 
firms (42.6% of the sample) at the 50% compliance level to 42 firms (21.3% of the sample) 
at the 60% compliance level.    
The Director’s Report was initially examined to determine if the company uses 
ESOs as part of their remuneration.  The Corporations Act (2001) requires information 
regarding stock options to be disclosed in the directors’ report.  Once this was determined, 
the notes to the financial statements were examined for the information regarding ESOs.  
Even if the company did not issue options that year, but had an option plan in place, the 
disclosures still should have been made in relation to the options under the scheme.  
Several notes were examined in order to capture all necessary information with each 
                                                 
7 We found that when we tested the data using a 0/1 binary variable in a regression model, using 50 percent 
or greater compliance level as the dependent variable, we lost information and the model was not as strong as 
that using 60 percent or greater compliance level. This was also the case for the univariate tests carried out.  
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company disclosing the information regarding ESOs differently. These notes include the 
share capital/contributed equity note, options/ownership based remuneration/executive 
remuneration/employee entitlements notes and related party transactions. 
 
 
Additional Analysis – Voluntary Disclosures 
Much of the prior literature in disclosure quality analyses the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and firm characteristics. Therefore, we are examining the relationship 
between the disclosure quality of voluntary information about stock options and firm 
characteristics.  
The voluntary information categories include: early adopters of AASB1028 (2001), 
fair value information, and the elements of the Black-Scholes valuation model.  This has 
been added because the new version of AASB 1028 was issued in the year 2001 for firm 
years after 1 July 2002, so some companies may make the decision to comply with it 
earlier.   The fair value and Black-Scholes information has been added into the index 
because it is information that the companies are not required to provide in relation to stock 
options issued.  AASB1028 does not require the fair value of options issued to be 
provided. Perhaps in anticipation of the new standard, some companies have started to 
disclose more voluntary information. A score of one is given for each item in the index that 
is disclosed, both quantitative and qualitative, and a zero is given if companies do not 
disclose any of this voluntary information (see Appendix B).   
 
4.3 Independent Variables 
a) Compensation Committee 
A company’s compensation committee (C_COMMEE) is measured using a 0/1 
dichotomous variable.  A zero is given to those companies who do not have a 
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compensation committee and a one is given to those companies that do have a 
compensation committee.  Hypothesis one predicts a positive relationship between the 
existence of a compensation committee and higher transparency. 
 
b) Ownership concentration  
The empirical proxy used here for ownership concentration (OSHP_CON) is the extent of 
minority interest.  The extent of minority interest is measured as 100% minus the 
percentage of wholly owned subsidiaries and therefore is a continuous variable.  One of the 
note disclosures required to be made by Australian companies is a list of the controlled 
entities (subsidiaries) and the equity holdings in each subsidiary.    From this note 
disclosure, it can be ascertained how many of the subsidiaries are wholly owned and how 
many subsidiaries have some level of minority interest. The variable, ownership 
concentration, is measured by the extent of minority stakeholders, that is, one minus the 
percentage of subsidiaries in each sample company that are wholly owned (McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe, 1993).8  Hypothesis two predicts a positive relationship between lower 
ownership concentration and more transparent disclosures.  Here, the larger is the variable 
the lower is ownership concentration. 
 
c) Listing Status 
Listing status (LIST_USA) is measured using a 0/1 dichotomous variable.  A zero is 
awarded where the company is not listed in the U.S., and a score of one is awarded where 
the company is listed on the U. S. stock exchange.  However, the ASX must be the primary 
                                                 
8 The focus is on the number of subsidiaries rather than the magnitude of minority shareholdings because a 
‘case of fraud can be brought by any minority shareholder, and is not dependent on the size of the minority 
interest’ (McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993, 42).  
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listing for the company.  Hypothesis three predicts a positive relationship between higher 
transparency and being listed on the U.S. stock exchange. 
Control Variables 
a) Size 
The size of a firm can influence the level of disclosures in the companies’ annual reports.  
Larger firms are more visible to the public and can have larger political and agency costs, 
therefore, larger firms disclose more information than smaller firms and also disclose more 
voluntary and mandatory information (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999 and Imhoff, 1992).  
Coulton et al. (2001) have also found that larger firms disclose more voluntary information 
about the CEO compensation that they award.  Size (LOGASSET) is measured as the log 
of total assets, because of the large difference in the amount of assets, for example 
$217,671,000,000 as opposed to $7,147,707.  Based on previous literature, this study 
predicts that size will be positively related to transparency. 
 
b) Leverage  
Hope’s (2003c) results indicate that firms increase disclosure to reduce agency costs. Firms 
that are more highly leveraged incur more monitoring costs, and therefore attempt to 
reduce these costs by increasing their disclosures in the annual reports (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  These studies suggest that there will be a positive relationship between 
leverage and disclosure.  The results from studies completed on linking leverage and 
disclosure levels are inconclusive because of mixed results, with some studies finding a 
significant association whereas others do not.  Leverage (LEVERAGE) is measured as 
long term debt/total assets, and hence is a continuous variable9.  This study has no 
                                                 
9 This variable was also measured as total liabilities divided by total tangible assets.  The results were not as 
strong using this measure. 
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prediction for the relationship between leverage and transparency because the prior 
literature has reported mixed findings. 
 
c) Performance 
Economic performance has been found to be associated with a firm’s disclosure practices.  
For example, firms that are performing relatively well are more forthcoming in their 
disclosures as opposed to firms that are performing poorly.  These firms may fail to 
disclose their poor performance in a timely manner (Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki, 2000 and 
Coulton et al., 2001).  Ahmed and Courtis (1992) also found some evidence to suggest that 
there is a positive relationship between voluntary disclosure levels and profitability.  
Singhvi and Desai (1971) argue that higher profitability motivates management to provide 
greater disclosure in the annual reports because it increases investor confidence in the 
company, which results in an increase in management compensation.  There has been 
conflicting results in the prior literature relating to disclosure levels and performance, and 
therefore the results of these studies are regarded as inconclusive.  The performance 
(PERFORM) of companies is measured by operating profit after tax scaled by sales, 
making this a continuous variable.  This study has no predictions for a relationship 
between performance and transparency due to the mixed findings of the prior literature. 
 
d) Auditor  
Larger audit firms, i.e. Big 5, may be associated with greater disclosure levels (Firth, 
1979).  Some studies have found a positive relationship between large audit firms and 
higher disclosure levels (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Firth, 1979).   Ahmed and Courtis 
(1992) have found that the level of compliance with mandatory requirements is significant 
for firms’ using big audit firms as opposed to those firms using small audit firms.  Previous 
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studies, however, have found a significant negative association between large audit firms 
and mandatory disclosure compliance (Wallace and Naser, 1995).  The auditor (AUDIT) is 
measured using a 0/1 dichotomous variable.  Companies using non-Big 5 auditors are 
awarded a score of zero and a score of one if they use a Big 5 auditor.  There is no 
prediction on the relationship between the type of auditor and transparency because of the 
mixed results found in the prior literature. 
 
Model Development 
Transparency of Stock Options Disclosures 
This study develops a regression model, based on the information presented above, that 
examines the association between disclosure transparency and firm characteristics.  
TRANSP is the function used to examine the relationship between firm characteristics and 
disclosure quality.  The measure of transparency represents a firm’s actual disclosure score 
as a percentage of that firm’s total possible disclosure score.  The regression model is 
expressed as follows: 
TRANSP = β1 + β2C_COMMEE + β3OSHP_CON + + β4LIST_USA + β5BIG_5 + β6PERFORM + 
β7LEVERAGE + β8SIZE + β9YR2000/2002 + ε  
 
Variable Definitions: 
TRANSP = firm’s actual disclosure scores/firm’s total possible disclosure scores (continuous 
variable) 
C_COMMEE = 1 for existence of compensation committee, 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
OSHP_CON = 1 - %wholly owned subsidiaries (continuous variable - the larger is the variable the 
lower is ownership concentration) 
LIST_USA     = 1 for listed in U.S., 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
BIG 5 = 1 for Big-5 auditor, 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
PERFORM  = Operating profit after tax scaled by sales (continuous variable) 
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LEVERAGE  = Long term debt scaled by total assets (continuous variable) 
SIZE                         = Log of total assets 
YR2000/2002     = 0 for year 2000 and 1 for the year 2002 
 
5.4 Descriptive Results 
 Table 1 reports the descriptive information on the variables used. Table 2 reports 
the compliance of firms at different compliance levels.  For the year 2000, only 34 of the 
96 companies (35%) comply at a level of 50% or greater. Compliance increases for the 
year 2002 to 50 companies of the 101 companies (50%).  By the 60% compliance level, for 
2000 only 12 companies (13%) comply and for 2002, compliance increases to 30 
companies (30%).  For the combined sample, no company has fully disclosed all 
requirements of the applicable accounting standards.  One company is close to full 
compliance at 92.50%. 
[INSERT TABLES 1 and 2 HERE] 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for each disclosure component as well as 
providing the descriptive statistics for the overall disclosure index for mandatory 
disclosures. The mean for each mandatory disclosure component indicates that companies 
withhold information regarding their ESOs in all areas of the standard. The highest mean 
(59.79%) was for the area which consists of information regarding the number and type of 
equity based instruments acquired up to and still available at reporting date, and the market 
price of those shares or other equity interests as at the reporting date.  Firms are the most 
forthcoming in this area which is not surprising as these disclosures are the least sensitive 
or alternatively publicly available information.  The component with the lowest mean is the 
area for price information (29.44%).  Firms are withholding how much, if anything, the 
executives are paying to acquire the stock options. One explanation of this low level of 
disclosure is that these are the most sensitive disclosures.  The average level of overall 
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compliance with AASB1028 and AASB1017 is 45.16%.  This is barely half the amount 
that they are required to disclose by law.  The maximum score achieved was 92.50% by 
one firm. 
 [INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Table 3 also provides the mean disclosure scores for 2000 and 2002 in order to 
draw comparisons.  In comparing the disclosure components of the financial year 2002, to 
that of the financial year 2000, it can be seen that the average level of compliance across 
all components has increased.  The component, equity-based instruments acquired up to 
and still available at reporting date and the market price of the instruments at reporting date 
still remains the component with the highest mean (65.74%), indicating that this area is 
where firms are most forthcoming in stock options information.  Although the average 
score for price information has increased in 2002 (34.65%), it still remains the component 
where firms are the least forthcoming.  The average score for total compliance has also 
increased slightly in 2002 (49.93%) from 2000 (40.14%).  In the year 2002, compliance is 
almost at 50%. After looking at these descriptive statistics for the components of the 
disclosures index it can be seen that companies in 2002 exhibit greater transparency in 
their ESO disclosures than 2000.   
 
5. Results 
Table 5 presents the correlation among the independent variables and indicates that 
while there are several statistically significant correlations between some of the variables, 
none of them are highly correlated.   
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 Table 5 reports the results of the linear regression to test the association between 
transparency and firm characteristics where TRANSP is measured as a continuous 
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variable. The variable, compensation committee is significant and positive (p<0.05) as 
predicted, indicating that this measure of corporate governance is associated with increased 
disclosures. This result is consistent with the expectation of Coulton et al. that corporate 
governance attributes may be associated with the degree of transparency of compensation 
disclosures. Their expectation is based on the evidence of Core, Holthausen and Larcker 
(1999) that weaker corporate governance is associated with excessive CEO compensation. 
The coefficients for the variables, ownership concentration and listing status, are 
unexpectedly negative. The variable YR2000/2002 is significant (p<0.05) and positive 
indicating that the overall disclosures have increased in 2002. The control variables that are 
significant (p<0.01) and positive are size and Big 5 auditor.  
 [INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 Tables 6, 7 and 8 report the results of the model “Transparency of Stock Options 
Disclosures” using the dichotomous dependent variable with 1 set as 60% or greater 
compliance level and 0 less than 60% compliance.  Tables 6 and 7 present the results of the 
univariate tests conducted to test three of the four hypotheses. Table 6 reports that the 
variable, compensation committee is significant (p<0.01) and positive, indicating that this 
measure of corporate governance is associated with increased disclosures. Table 7 shows 
that the coefficient for the variable, ownership concentration is again unexpectedly 
negative.  
[INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7 HERE] 
 Table 8 reports the results of the logistic regression to test the relationship between 
transparency, measured as a dichotomous variable with 1 set as 60% or greater compliance 
level and 0 less than 60% compliance, and firm characteristics. The results are consistent 
with the univariate results. The variable, compensation committee is significant and 
positive (p<0.05) as predicted, indicating that this measure of corporate governance is 
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associated with increased disclosures. This result is consistent with the expectation of 
Coulton et al. that corporate governance attributes may be associated with the degree of 
transparency of compensation disclosures. Once again the coefficients for the variables, 
ownership concentration and listing status are negative contrary to the predictions. The 
variable, YR2000/2002, is also significant (p<0.05) and positive indicating that disclosures 
are increasing in 2002. The control variable, size, is significant and positive (p<0.01) 
consistent with the literature that larger firms have increased disclosures.  Leverage, is 
another control variable that is significant but negative (p<0.05) indicating that in this 
disclosure setting firms with higher leverage are not providing more transparent 
disclosures.  In the linear regression the coefficient on leverage although negative was not 
significant.  We had not predicted a direction for leverage as the results from studies 
linking leverage and disclosure levels have provided mixed results. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
Additional Analysis – Voluntary Disclosures 
Table 9 reports the descriptive statistics for each disclosure component as well as 
providing the descriptive statistics for the overall disclosure index for the additional 
voluntary disclosures. In relation to the voluntary disclosure index, we observe that no 
companies were early adopters of the new AASB 1028 (2001) accounting standard.  The 
average level of voluntary disclosure is 10.21%. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
The average scores for the voluntary components have also all increased in 2002 
except for the early adopter’s component.  As before, this component is zero because there 
were no firms who had adopted the new AASB 1028 (2001) accounting standard.  Overall, 
the average total voluntary disclosure has increased.  These results indicate that firms are 
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providing more voluntary disclosures about their ESOs.  For example, although firms are 
not required to recognise the cost of issuing ESOs, some of the larger firms are disclosing 
the fact that they are not required to do so in their financial reports for the year ending 30 
June 2002. 
Table 10 reports the results of the linear regression to test the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and firm characteristics. Consistent with the other models, the 
coefficients for the variables, ownership concentration and listing status, are unexpectedly 
negative. However, the variable YR2000/2002 is significant (p<0.01) and positive and the 
control variable, size, significant (p<0.01) and positive which is consistent with the other 
models. 
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
 
6. Summary  
 The objective of this study was to evaluate the transparency of ESO disclosures in 
Australian annual reports.  The requirements of the accounting standards AASB 1028 
‘Accounting for Employee Entitlements’ and AASB 1017 ‘Related Party Disclosures’ 
were used to form a disclosure index to score the disclosures that companies were making 
because these standards contain specific disclosure requirements for ESOs.   We 
investigated, firstly, the transparency of firms with the mandatory accounting standards 
(AASB 1028 and AASB 1017), secondly, the characteristics that are related to higher 
transparency and finally whether transparency of ESO disclosures has improved from the 
year 2000 to the year 2002.  
The results indicate that companies with a compensation committee provide more 
transparent ESO disclosures than companies without a compensation committee indicating 
that the existence of a compensation committee may represent stronger corporate 
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governance promoting more transparent disclosures.  Compliance with the ESO 
disclosures has improved between the year 2000 and 2002. Size is the only control variable 
that is significant in both models. 
Although compliance has improved from 2000 to 2002, overall compliance with ESO 
disclosures is low. Only four companies displayed 80% or greater compliance with one 
firm exhibiting 90% or greater compliance level. For the year 2000, only 34 of the 96 
companies (35%) comply at a level of 50% or greater increasing to 50 companies of the 
101 companies (50%) for the year 2002.   The component of the standard with the lowest 
mean disclosure is price information (29.44%).  Firms are withholding how much, if 
anything, the executives are paying to acquire the stock options indicating that these are 
the most sensitive disclosures.  The surprisingly overall low level of compliance illustrates 
the perceived negative impact of full disclosure in this controversial area. Perhaps there are 
limited incentives to comply with the standard considering that Hope (2003a) found 
Australia to be a country where managers are treating mandatory requirements as 
voluntary. 10,11
Our results are subject to several limitations.  The first limitation is the sample size of 
firms using options.  The size is mainly due to the very selective criteria used in choosing 
companies to be included.  Another limitation is in regards to the generalisability of the 
results. Our study is not specific to any particular industry. An avenue for future research 
would be examining the financial years 2003 to 2005.  The AASB1028 accounting 
standard effective from 1 July 2002 required more detailed disclosures of stock options; 
                                                 
10 The Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) conducted a surveillance project in 2003 
and found evidence of non-compliance with accounting standards. This surveillance project was aimed at 
compliance in general focusing on four accounting standards in particular. It was not a thorough investigation 
of compliance with all accounting standards. For firms found to be non-compliant with the legislation, the 
penalties were not severe. 
 
11 The CLERP 9 Legislation effective for financial years beginning on or after 1 July 2004 requires 
additional disclosure of share options where a performance condition is or is not applicable. 
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however, it still did not require the measurement or recognition of ESOs issued.  The 
Australian Equivalents of the International Reporting Standards (AEIFRS) are effective for 
financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2005. The requirements of the standard 
related to stock options are more comprehensive than the previous accounting standards, 
by requiring more details about options to be disclosed as well as the recognition of 
director and executive stock options in the financial statements.  
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Appendix A: Components of Mandatory Stock Options Disclosure Index 
 Reference Score Company 
“X”  
AASB 1028 (1994):   2000 
Nature of Equity Based Compensation Scheme    
 a) description of the nature of the scheme (b) including the number 
of employees eligible to participate, the groups of employees eligible 
to participate (if the scheme is not open to all employees),  
Para 14 (d)(i) 2 0 
 the number and types of shares or other equity interests employees 
are able to acquire  
Para 14 (d)(i) 1 0 
 the exercise date or period during which employees can acquire 
shares or other equity interests under the scheme. 
Para14 (d)(i) 1 1 
Component score  4 1 
Price Information    
 (a) the price(s) that employees are to pay for any shares or other 
equity interests issued under an ownership-based remuneration 
scheme or, (b) if the price(s) are not determinable as at the reporting 
date, how such prices will be determined. 
Para 14(d)(ii) 1 0 
Component score  1 0 
Number and Type Up to and at Reporting Date    
 (a) the number and (b) types of shares or other equity interests that 
employees have acquired or have become entitled to acquire under 
the scheme up to the reporting date 
Para 14 
(d)(iii) 
2 2 
 (a) the number and (b) types of shares or other equity interests still 
available to employees under the scheme as at the reporting date and 
(c) the market price of those shares or other equity interests as at the 
reporting date. 
Para 14 
(d)(iii) 
3 3 
Component score  5 5 
Number and Type Issued, During the Year    
 (a) the number and (b) types of shares or other equity interests that 
have been issued to employees during the financial year 
Para 14 
(d)(iv) 
2 2 
 the total market value of those shares or other equity interests at issue 
date; and  
Para 14 
(d)(iv) 
1 1 
 the total amount received and/or receivable from employees for 
those shares or other equity interests 
Para 14 
(d)(iv) 
1 1 
Component score  4 4 
Accounting Policy Information    
 (a) details of the employer's accounting policy in respect of 
ownership-based remuneration schemes, (b) and any amounts 
recognised in the accounts and consolidated accounts in relation to 
the financial year. 
 
Para 14 (d)(v) 
2 1 
Component score  2 1 
AASB 1017    
 the aggregate number of options acquired by those directors; 
 aggregate number of options acquired classified by issuing entity and 
class of option 
 the aggregate number of options disposed of by those directors; 
 aggregate number of options disposed of classified by issuing entity 
and class of option 
 the nature of the terms and conditions of each different type of 
transaction if on terms and conditions more favourable than those 
which it is reasonable to expect the issuing entity would have 
adopted if dealing with the holder at arm’s length in the same 
circumstances. 
 the aggregate number of options held as at reporting date directly, 
indirectly or beneficially by directors of the reporting entity in any 
entity in the economic entity classified by issuing entity and class of 
option. 
Para 4.15 (a) 
 
Para 4.15 (b) 
 
Para 4.15 (c) 
 
Para 4.16 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
1 
Component Score  6 5 
Overall Compliance Score for Company “X” = 59.70%    
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Appendix B 
 Components of Voluntary Stock Options Disclosure Index 
 
 
Early Adopters of AASB 1028 (2001): 
 Score Company 
“X” 
2000
 Early Adopters   1 0 
Component Score  1 0 
Fair Value Information:    
 Fair Value of stock options 
 Methodology for fair Value (e.g. Black Scholes) 
 Compensation Expense 
 1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
Component Score  3 0 
Black Scholes Components:    
 Exercise Price 
 Dividend yield 
 Risk free rate 
 Volatility of share price 
 Term of option 
 Share price at grant date 
 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Component Score  6 1 
Overall Voluntary Score for Company “X” = 5.60%    
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Figure 1  
Sample taken from Top 400 Publicly Listed Companies for 2000 and 2002  
 
 
Companies included in sample 2000 2002 
Companies using stock options as a form of executive compensation  96 101 
   
Reason for elimination from sample   
Not using stock options as a form of executive compensation 47 42 
Did not have 30 June year end 67 67 
Company was a trust or fund 44 44 
Not an Australian company 14 14 
Experienced a change in name, i.e. possible change in ownership 109 109 
Annual report not available on Connect 4 database 23 23 
   
Total companies eliminated from sample 304 299 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of the Firm Characteristics of Firms using Executive Stock 
Option Disclosures for 2000 and 2002; N=197 (Pooled Sample) 
 
Variables Mean      Std. Dev   Minimum         Maximum      Skewness      Kurtosis       
                      
        
Compensation  0.711        0.455              0.000              1.000       -0.936  -1.135  
Committee 
 
Ownership  0.062         0.095           0.000              0.548        2.233   6.190 
Concentration          
 
Listing Status       0.030        0.172              0.000              1.000        4.691          20.207   
          
Size  8.554           0.764              6.711            11.397        0.592   1.156  
       
Big 5  0.888          0.316              0.000              1.000       -2.485   4.217  
 
Leverage 0.185         0.205     0.000            1.9812             4.022              30.513  
            
Performance    0.192         3.667  -13.789            48.499           11.424           156.612     
                           
            
Variable Definitions: 
C_COMMEE = 1 for compensation committee, 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
OSHP_CON = 1 - %wholly owned subsidiaries (continuous variable) 
LIST_USA = 1 for listed in U.S., 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
BIG 5 = 1 for Big-5 auditor, 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
PEFORM    = Operating profit after tax scaled by sales (continuous variable) 
LEVERAGE    = Long term debt scaled by total assets (continuous variable) 
SIZE     = log of total assets (Size) (continuous variable 
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Table 2 
Disclosure Quality of Firms using Executive Stock Options for 2000 and 2002 under 
AASB1028 and AASB 1017 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Disclosure Components (Pooled Sample) 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean 
2000 
Mean 
2002 
Mandatory: 
(n=197) 
     
(n=96) 
 
(n=101) 
AASB 1028 
(1994) 
      
Nature of Equity 
Based 
Compensation 
Scheme 
0.3794 0.2295 0.0000 1.0000 0.3567 .4009 
Price Information 0.2944 0.4569 0.0000 1.0000 0.2395 0.3465 
Number and Type 
Up to and at 
Reporting Date 
0.5979 0.3362 0.0000 1.0000 0.5354 0.6574 
Number and Type 
Issued, During the 
Year 
0.5520 0.2590 0.0000 1.0000 0.5234 0.5792 
Accounting 
Policy 
Information 
0.3908 0.3600 0.0000 1.0000 0.2864 0.4901 
AASB 1017 0.4949 0.3332 0.0000 1.0000 0.4670 0.5214 
Total Mandatory 
Disclosure 
0.4516 0.1954 0.0000 0.9250 0.4014 0.4993 
 
 
 
 
Compliance Level  2000  
(n=96) 
2002 
(n=101) 
Total Firms 
(n=197) (continuous disclosure score) 
50% or greater 34 50 
(35.4%) (49.5%) 
84 
(42.6%) 
60%  or greater 12 
(12.5%) 
30 
(29.7%) 
42 
(21.3%) 
70%  or greater 5 
(5.2%) 
15 
(15.6%) 
20 
(10.2%) 
80%  or greater 0 
 
4 
 
4 
90%  or greater 0 
 
1 
 
1 
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Table 4 
Spearman Pairwise Correlation Coefficients between the Explanatory & Control 
Variables 
 
Variable Oshp_Con List_USA C_Commee Big 5 Size Perform 
 
Leverage 
Oshp Con  
1.000 
      
 
List USA 
 
0.177* 
 
1.000 
 
     
C Commee -0.009 -0.017 1.000     
Big 5 0.089 0.063 0.058 1.000    
 
Size 0.386** 0.283** 0.193** 0.281** 1.000 
 
  
Perform -0.067 0.074 0.060 0.185** 0.179* 1.000 
 
 
Leverage 0.166* 0.119 0.079 0.326** 0.424** 0.060 1.000 
 
 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10 respectively 
 
Variable Definitions: 
C_COMMEE = 1 for compensation committee, 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
OSHP_CON = 1- %wholly owned subsidiaries (continuous variable) 
LIST_USA = 1 for listed in U.S., 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
BIG 5 = 1 for Big-5 auditor, 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
PEFORM    = Operating profit after tax scaled by sales (continuous variable) 
LEVERAGE    = Long term debt scaled by total tangible assets (continuous variable) 
SIZE = Log of total assets (continuous variable) 
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Table 5 
Linear Regression of the Association between Transparency and Firm 
Characteristics  
TRANSP = β1 ++ β2C_COMMEE + β3OSHIP_CON + β4LIST_USA + β5BIG_5 + β6PERFORM + 
β7LEVERAGE + β8SIZE + β9YR_END2 + ε  
 
 
***, **, and * indicate one-tailed significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10 respectively 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Significance 
Constant ? -0.184 0.149 -1.235 0.109 
C_COMMEE + 0.054 0.028 1.916 0.029** 
OSHP_CON + -0.263 0.134 -1.959 0.052*
LIST_USA + -0.163 0.077 -2.110 0.036** 
BIG_5 ? 0.173 0.042 4.147 0.000*** 
PERFORM ? 0.001 0.003 0.251 0.401 
LEVERAGE ? -0.070 0.063 -1.100 0.137 
SIZE + 0.051 0.019 2.731 0.004*** 
YR2000/2002 + 0.087 0.025 3.484 0.001*** 
 
Number of observations:  197 
P-value for model:  0.000 
F-statistic for model: 7.285   
Adjusted R² for model =    0.204 
 
Variable Definitions: 
TRANSP = firm’s actual disclosure scores/firm’s total possible disclosure scores (continuous 
variable) 
C_COMMEE = 1 for compensation committee, 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
OSHP_CON = 1- %wholly owned subsidiaries (continuous variable - the larger is the variable the 
lower is ownership concentration) 
LIST_USA     = 1 for listed in US, 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
BIG 5 = 1 for Big-5 auditor, 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
PERFORM  = operating profit after tax scaled by sales (continuous variable) 
LEVERAGE  = long term debt scaled by total assets (continuous variable) 
SIZE                         = log of total assets (continuous variable) 
YR2000/2002           = 0 for year 2000 and 1 for the year 2002 (dichotomous variable) 
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Table 6 
Transparency (Higher versus Lower) for Firms by the Existence of a Compensation 
Committee and Listing Status at the 60% or greater Compliance Level 
 
 
 Higher Lower  
 
Disclosures  Disclosures  
 =1 ≥ .60      = 0 ≤ .60 
 
Panel A:    
 Compensation Committee 38 102 
 
No Compensation Committee 4 53  
  χ2 = 9.781 
p = 0.001 
 
 
 
Panel B:   
Listed in USA 1 5 
Non Listed in USA 41 150 
 χ2 = 0.080   
p = 1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Compensation Committee 0/1 dichotomous variable set to 1 if a compensation committee exists in 
the company. 
  
Listed in USA 0/1 dichotomous variable set to 1 if the firm is listed in the U.S. 
 
High/Low Disclosure   0/1 dichotomous variable set to 1 if the firms weighted disclosure score is 
50% or 60% or greater. 
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Table 7 
Transparency (Higher versus Lower) for Firms in relation to Ownership 
Concentration at the 60% or Greater Compliance Level 
 
Dependent Variable Transparency 
 Higher 
Transparency  
= 1 ≥ .60      
Lower 
Transparency 
= 0 ≤ .60 
 
Ownership concentration 
 
 
 
42 
0.0351 
155 
0.0694 
(0.1027) 
 
-2.967 
 
0.004*** 
(0.0525) 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10 respectively 
 
Ownership concentration  1 - % subsidiaries wholly owned (the larger is the variable the lower is  
  ownership concentration) 
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Table 8 
Logistic Regression Analysis of the Association between Transparency and Firms 
Characteristics at the 60% or Greater Compliance Level  
TRANSP = β1 + β2C_COMMEE + β3OSHIP_CON + + β4LIST_USA + β5BIG_5 + β6PERFORM + 
β7LEVERAGE + β8SIZE + β9YR2000/2002 + ε  
 
 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Wald 
Statistic 
Significance 
Constant ? -12.360 2.887 18.330 0.000*** 
C_COMMEE + 1.353 0.590 5.259 0.011** 
OSHP_CON + -9.598 3.608 7.076 0.008***
LIST_USA + -1.248 1.256 0.987 0.320 
BIG_5 ? 1.094 0.860 1.618 0.102 
PERFORM ? -0.066 0.185 0.129 0.360 
LEVERAGE ? -2.583 1.560 2.743 0.049** 
SIZE + 1.082 0.326 11.045 0.001*** 
YR2000/2002 + 0.867 0.407 4.535 0.017** 
 
***, **, and * indicate one-tailed significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10 respectively 
 
Number of observations:  197   
p-value for model:  0.000 
Chi-Square Statistic:  39.510 
Nagelkerke R²:  0.285 
 
Variable Definitions: 
TRANSP     = 1 = high disclosure quality when disclosure score is equal to or greater than     
60%; 0 = low disclosure quality,   (dichotomous variable) 
C_COMMEE = 1 for existence of compensation committee, 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
OSHP_CON = 1- %wholly owned subsidiaries (continuous variable - the larger is the variable the 
lower is ownership concentration) 
LIST_USA     = 1 for listed in U.S., 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
BIG 5 = 1 for Big-5 auditor, 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
PERFORM = Operating profit after tax scaled by sales (continuous variable) 
LEVERAGE = Long term debt scaled by total assets (continuous variable) 
SIZE      = log of total assets (continuous variable) 
YR2000/2002     = 0 for year 2000 and 1 for the year 2002 (dichotomous variable) 
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Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Disclosure Components (Pooled Sample) 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Mean 
2000 
Mean 
2002 
Voluntary: 
(n=197) 
     
(n=96) 
 
(n=101) 
Early Adopters 
of AASB 1028 
(2001) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Fair Value 
Information 
0.1015 0.2424 0.0000 1.0000 0.0451 0.1551 
Black Scholes 
Components 
0.2047 0.2371 0.0000 1.0000 0.1736 0.2343 
Total Voluntary 
Disclosure 
0.1021 0.1425 0.0000 0.667 0.0729 0.1298 
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Table 10 
Results of Linear Regression of the Association between Voluntary Disclosure and 
Firm Characteristics  
TRANSP = β1 + β2C_COMMEE + β3OSHIP_CON + + β4LIST_USA + β5BIG_5 + β6PERFORM + 
β7LEVERAGE + β8SIZE + β9YR_END2 + ε  
 
***, **, and * indicate one-tailed significance at p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.10 respectively 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Significance 
Constant ? -0.475 0.107 -4.430 0.000*** 
C_COMMEE + 0.018 0.020 0.879 0.191 
 
Number of observations:  197 
P-value for model:  0.000 
F-statistic for model: 8.229   
Adjusted R² for model =    0.228 
 
Variable Definitions: 
TRANSP = firm’s actual disclosure score of additional voluntary information/firm’s total possible 
disclosure score of additional voluntary information (continuous variable) 
C_COMMEE = 1 for compensation committee, 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
OSHP_CON = 1- %wholly owned subsidiaries (continuous variable - the larger is the variable the 
lower is ownership concentration) 
LIST_USA     = 1 for listed in US, 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
BIG 5 = 1 for Big-5 auditor, 0 otherwise (dichotomous variable) 
PERFORM  = operating profit after tax scaled by sales (continuous variable) 
LEVERAGE  = long term debt scaled by total assets (continuous variable) 
SIZE                         = log of total assets (continuous variable) 
YR2000/2002           = 0 for year 2000 and 1 for the year 2002 (dichotomous variable) 
OSHP_CON + -0.191 0.096 -1.978 0.049**
LIST_USA + -0.183 0.055 3.298 0.001*** 
BIG_5 ? 0.004 0.030 0.140 0.445 
PERFORM ? -0.001 0.002 -0.431 0.334 
LEVERAGE ? -0.058 0.046 -1.269 0.103 
SIZE + 0.065 0.013 4.857 0.000*** 
YR2000/2002 + 0.048 0.018 2.669 0.004*** 
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